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1. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the largest post-war recession, OECD governments have run up record 
peacetime budget deficits. The recent world financial and economic crisis together with the 
more recent European debt crisis have added to peacetime budget deficits recorded by OECD 
governments and led to a substantial deterioration of their public finances. Today, as 
measures to make their public finances sustainable, many of them are being forced to adopt 
fiscal consolidation measures. 
There is a substantial literature that shows that “fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on 
spending cuts on transfers and the government wage bill have a better chance of being 
successful and are expansionary. By contrast, fiscal adjustments which rely primarily on tax 
increases and cuts in public investment tend not to last and are contractionary” (see, for 
instance, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997a, 1998), McDermott and Wescott (1996), IMF 
(1996), OECD (1997) and Perotti (1997), Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Ardagna (2007), 
Alesina and Ardagna (2010), IMF (2010)). However, Heylen and Everaert (2000) empirically 
contest the findings according to which current expenditure reductions are the best policy to 
achieve a successful fiscal consolidation. 
Regarding fiscal expansions, Alesina and Perotti (1995a) find evidence that fiscal expansions 
typically occur through increases in expenditures. More recently, Alesina and Ardagna 
(2010) also show evidence that fiscal stimuli based on tax cuts are more likely to increase 
growth than those based upon spending increases. 
In view of all these different empirical results, one can question whether fiscal episodes in 
donor governments do not affect aid supply. Indeed, it is likely that during fiscal 
consolidation episodes where government expenditure will likely be curtailed, development 
aid supplied (that constitute a category of government expenditure) the traditional OECD 
DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries will also be reduced. Similarly, we can 
also expect donor governments to increase aid expenditure during fiscal stimuli years as the 
other categories of government spending rise. At the same time, these OECD DAC countries 
have committed either individually or collectively (through international meetings) to achieve 
a target level of aid flows granted to developing countries, commitments that were renewed at 
the Gleneagles summit. Evidence has also been shown in the empirical literature based on 
OECD Development Statistics that few advanced countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark) are enforcing the international ODA target of 0.7% of GNI.  
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Why such poor results in terms of aid supplies? One can look for political or geostrategic 
reasons. One can also look for economic reasons, that is, macroeconomic reasons and more 
particularly fiscal reasons. For example, the OECD communication (14th April 2010) 
stipulates that Africa will not likely receive more than the USD 11 billion of the USD 25 
billion promised at the Gleneagles summit, due to the adjustment measures adopted by the 
member countries in response to the recent financial and economic crisis. Moreover, recent 
figures1 regarding the net official development assistance (ODA) disbursements confirm its 
decline:  the overall net ODA of OECD DAC members (in per cent of their gross national 
income –GNI-) dropped in real terms by 2.7% in 2011, compared to 2010, situation reflecting 
fiscal constraints in several DAC countries which have affected their ODA budgets. In 
addition, Bilateral aid to sub-Saharan Africa also experiences a fall of -0.9% in real terms 
compared to 2010, whereas aid to the African continent increased by +0.9%, as donors 
provided more aid to North Africa after the revolutions in the region; the net bilateral ODA 
flows disbursed towards the group of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) also declines 
severely by 8.9% in 2011, compared to 2010.  
 This empirical literature on development aid issues has also already established that 
recipient-country characteristics such as income level, population, and political system (see 
e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Dollar and Levin, 2006) affect aid inflows. However, the part 
of the literature that deals with the donor side’s determinants of aid, especially the part that 
focuses on the fiscal variables, is brief and inconclusive. For example, Faini (2006) finds 
evidence that higher budget deficit and higher stock of public debt reduce aid, whereas 
Round and Odedokun (2004) and Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) find no significant 
relationship between deficits and aid provision. Moreover, none of these studies explore the 
effects that the fiscal episodes in donor countries may have on aid provision. In this paper, we 
focus on macroeconomic determinants of aid generosity (while controlling for potential other 
political and institutional variables) to investigate how donors behave in terms of (real) aid 
supplies during the fiscal episodes. In other words, we explore the long-run average (LRA) 
 
1
 See in the OECD Website:  
http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/developmentaidtodevelopingcountriesfallsbecauseofglobalre
cession.htm 

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effects of fiscal consolidation and stimuli episodes on OECD donor countries’ aid supplies, 
irrespective of their effect on per capita income and other economic and political variables. 
We follow the literature on fiscal episodes and use descriptive statistics and regression 
models to perform this analysis.   
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section (II), we provide a literature survey on 
the topic. We then explain how the fiscal episodes in OECD countries are determined (III). In 
section IV, we present our empirical model and discuss the econometric methodology. 
Section V presents empirical results and the last section (VI) concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several controversial studies have been conducted on the supply of foreign aid, with most 
of them relying on how recipients’ characteristics affect aid delivery. However, limited 
studies have dealt with the supply side determinants of aid flows from the donor’s perspective 
(i.e., the determinants of “aid effort” or “aid generosity”). For example, the focus of these 
studies on how macroeconomic variables (and especially fiscal policy ones) can theoretically 
and empirically affect aid generosity remains scarce. Beenstock (1980), Mosley (1985), Faini 
(2006), and more recently Jones (2011) have been the few authors who explore both 
theoretically and empirically the determinants of aid supplies. While controlling for other 
economic and political determinants of aid supply, Beenstock (1980) shows evidence that aid 
flows are negatively and significantly affected by the net budget surplus. Mosley (1985) 
concludes among other variables a positive and significant effect of the central government 
budget deficit on aid flows for Netherlands and United Kingdom, whereas the effect is not 
statistically significant for the other countries (Canada, France, West Germany, Japan, 
Norway, Sweden, USA). Faini (2006) concludes on a sample of 15 donor countries over the 
period 1980–2004 that an increase in the budget deficit or in the stock of debt leads to a 
severe decline of development assistance. Jones (2011) examines the aid expenditures 
response to banking crises in donor countries and observes among others that bilateral aid 
supplies2 are positively driven in both the long and short run by government expenditures (as 
a percentage of GDP).    
 
2
 Total bilateral aid is here the net bilateral aid disbursement minus debt relief (which 
excludes disbursements to multilateral organizations but includes support to NGOs and 
international private organizations) over the period 1960–2009. 

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Besides these results based on theoretical models, several other empirical studies have been 
conducted on this topic. These studies encompass three main strands: the first one comprise 
studies that do not find any significant effect of fiscal variables on aid effort (Round and 
Odedokun 2004 and Boschini and Olofsgard, 2007 for fiscal balance variable; and Mendoza 
et al. 2009 for tax revenue variable); the second includes studies that conclude for a positive 
effect of fiscal variables on aid effort (Mold et al. 2010 for fiscal balance variable and Chong 
and Gradstein 2002 for tax revenue variable). The last strand deals with the studies that 
empirically show that the budget surplus is achieved by cutting aid along with many other 
spending categories (Bertoli et al. 2008; Dang et al. 2010). In addition, a recent study (Fuchs 
et al., 2012) provides a comprehensive review of the existing literature on donors’ aid 
budgets and examines the variables that determine robustly aid effort (measured by the 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) as a share of gross national income) of the 22 
OECD DAC members. This study is conducted over the period 1976-2008 and tests several 
hypotheses concerning international, domestic politics and macroeconomic determinants of 
aid effort as well as the potential substitute and complements of ODA. The authors observe 
among variables capturing the overall budget constraints and macroeconomic conditions that, 
only the debt burden appears to be negatively and significantly associated with aid generosity 
of OECD countries. Overall, we can infer from this empirical literature that “the fiscal 
determinants of aid supply contradict one another sufficiently so that there is no trenchant 
evidence on the relationship between fiscal policy and aid flows.” Our purpose in the 
following sections is to understand how fiscal variables, especially fiscal episodes, namely 
fiscal consolidation and fiscal stimuli episodes in donor countries, affect aid expenditures 
distribution among developing countries. The next section will consider how these fiscal 
episodes in OECD countries are determined. 
 
3. THE DETERMINATION OF FISCAL EPISODES IN OECD COUNTRIES 
The choice of the approach to measure the fiscal episodes is a critical point when assessing 
effects on aid supplies. The empirical literature provides several definitions for timing fiscal 
contractions and stimuli, with most of them relying on the structural budget balance concept, 
the balance that results from intentional actions of policymakers. Fiscal episodes 
(consolidations and stimuli) result from the attempts of the governments to change the 
budgetary position of the government: fiscal consolidations or stabilizations aim at adopting 
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discretionary fiscal policies that cut budget deficits while fiscal stimuli consist of 
discretionary fiscal policies that increase budget deficits. To identify fiscal consolidation 
episodes, we need to compute a measure of fiscal impulse. The fiscal impulse is the 
discretionary change in budgetary position and can be measured as the difference between the 
actual budgetary position and what would prevail under a benchmark cyclical situation 
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995a). In this paper, we follow (Alesina and Perotti, 1995a), Ardagna 
and Alesina (2010) for identifying fiscal episodes. The latter use Blanchard’s (1993) 
approach3 to compute the cyclically adjusted primary balance. 
Once calculating the fiscal impulse measure, we need a rule to identify the fiscal episodes 
(fiscal consolidations and fiscal stimuli periods). The criteria used in the existing literature to 
identify these episodes differ slightly from paper to paper. In this paper, we apply the original 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) definitions, re-employed recently in Ardagna and Alesina (2010) 
and also widely used in practice. According to those definitions:  
- “A period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance improves by at least 1.5 percent of GDP.” 
- “A period of fiscal stimulus is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance deteriorates by at least 1.5 percent of GDP.” 
Accordingly, we use the episodes of fiscal adjustments and stimuli identified by Ardagna and 
Alesina (2010) to examine their effects on aid efforts: the authors focus on a sample of 21 
OECD countries with data spanning 1970–2007. The countries included in their sample are: 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States. However, in our database, we exclude “Greece and 
Switzerland” because these countries have significantly short panels, though our results do 
not change if we include them. 
 Relying on large changes in fiscal policy stance, especially on the reductions and increases 
of budget deficits, Alesina and Ardagna (2010) use the Blanchard’s (1993) indicator of fiscal 
impulse (changes in the cyclically adjusted primary balance) to identify the fiscal episodes. 
 
3
 Note that in the empirical literature of fiscal episodes, there are three main techniques to 
compute the cyclically adjusted primary balance: the OECD technique, the IMF technique 
and the Blanchard technique. 

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Overall, they identify 107 periods of fiscal adjustments; 65 last only for one period, while the 
rest are multiperiod adjustments and 91 periods of fiscal stimuli with 52 lasting 1 year; the 
remaining are multiperiods. Appendix 3 list the episodes (years) of fiscal consolidation and 
fiscal stimuli identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010).     
 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
4.1 The model 
The baseline model estimated is the following: 
1 2 3 4
5 6 7
it
i t it
A Numbertight Numbertightsq Numberstimuli Numberstimulisq
Govnetlend Pubdebt Outputgap
α α α α
α α α µ η ε
= + + +
+ + + + + +
 (1) 
where i denotes the countries (i = 1,....., 19) and t denotes years (t = 1970, ......, 2007), and the 
dependent variable denotes the “aid variable” from the country i in year t.  
Within this framework, we are naturally confronted with the choice of the adequate “aid 
variable” to perform our analysis: should we consider aid on a commitment or net 
disbursement basis? We follow Roodman (2007) and choose to not use aid on a commitment 
basis because “aid commitments would reward donors for systematically over-promising aid 
as well as underestimating the absorptive capacity of aid recipients” (see also Bertoli et al., 
2008). Therefore, we think in terms of “disbursements” and consider the variable “net aid 
disbursements”. The latter can be the total net aid (bilateral and multilateral) disbursements as 
a percentage of GDP when debt forgiveness is subtracted out, as well as this variable broken 
down by channel (multilateral versus bilateral) and by recipient development income 
classification (the OECD classification)): bilateral aid, multilateral aid4, aid to LDCs, aid to 
other LICs, aid to LMICs and aid to UMICs. Note that we also include as one of our “aid 
dependent variables” the Aid (net of debt forgiveness) disbursed to Africa, given the different 
commitments of OECD DAC countries to increase substantially their aid supply to this 
region in order to help it achieve by 2015 the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The 
definitions and sources of the regressors are detailed in the Appendices 1 and 2.  are donor 
fixed effects that are incorporated in the model to capture the heterogeneity among countries 
 
4
 The Multilateral Aid is naturally not net of debt forgiveness.  

, ,
( / )i t i tA Aid GDP=
iµ
	ABC	ABCD



as well as the likely importance of unobservables correlated with the error term in 
determining aid flows.  are year dummies and are included in all specifications to account 
for common shocks to aid volume in any given year.  
The disturbance  is assumed to be identically and independently distributed (0, ), that 
is, assumed not correlated with the explanatory variables of the model and the normality of 
which is not required (Baltagi, 2002). 
The choice to subtract the debt forgiveness from the net ODA disbursements, in percent of 
GDP is dictated by several reasons. Indeed, several definitions of aid exist in the empirical 
literature: the aid commitments, the gross aid disbursements, the net aid disbursements, the 
net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness and the Net Aid Transfers of Roodman (2009). 
In this study, our choice is dictated by the fact that the debt cancellation does not give rise to 
an actual disbursement of funds. Moreover, debt cancellation may even imply a double-
counting of aid if the cancelled debt was granted on a concessional basis. As previously 
highlighted, we also break down for further analysis the net aid disbursement net of debt 
forgiveness by channel (multilateral versus Bilateral) and by recipient development income 
classification.  
 For robustness check of our results, we also use a set of time-varying and non-varying 
control variables derived from the empirical literature that are included once in the baseline 
model: the degree of trade openness; a variable capturing the ideological orientation of the 
government; the quality of bureaucracy; the level of population; the real effective exchange 
rate; banking crises; the unemployment rate; the inflation rate, the cold war, the welfare 
institutions and the voting similarity index in United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). As 
we note further, the coefficients of our variables in the baseline model are not significantly 
affected by the inclusion of these control variables (for robustness check). These results can 
be obtained upon request. 
Should our supply equation of aid flows have a dynamic specification? 
Wildavsky (1964) points out that current year’s spending in any public agency is 
predominantly influenced by the budget of the previous year. Mosley (1984) reinforces this 
argument by stressing that it is particularly true for aid agencies, since aid projects often run 
over several years, with financial flows being committed already in the first year. 
To explore statistically this likely dynamic specification, we follow the procedure 
suggested by Maddala (1987) and Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This procedure refers to a 
tη
,i tε
2
εσ
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Wald test to evaluate whether the lagged dependent variables has a direct effect on the 
dependent variable, apart from the indirect influence generated by serial correlations of the 
errors. If this is the case, then the model is called “state-dependence” or “system dynamic,” 
and if not, it is called “serial correlation” or “error dynamics.” In fact, there are two steps in 
the implementation of the test, as described in Maddala (1987): the first consists of testing 
whether a serial correlation model is to be used. For this purpose, a serial correlation model 
'
it it i ity x wβ α= + + with 1it it itw w uρ −= +  is reformulated as follows
'
1 1it it it t it ity y x x uρ β βρ η− −= + − + + . If there is serial correlation in the errors, then the 
coefficient of the lagged independent variables should be equal to minus the product of the 
coefficients of current x and lagged y. Second, once it has been established that a serial 
correlation model should not be used, it is tested whether  = 0. 
To perform the test, we use two lags of the dependent variable because additional lags appear 
not significant. The results are reported in Table 1. Accordingly, we estimate the previous 
described model specification with one and/or two lagged dependent variables, depending on 
the result obtained in Maddala’s (1987) test. While it is well known that the fixed-effects 
estimator generates biased results in a dynamic panel, Nickell (1981) proves that this bias 
decreases in the number of time periods and approaches zero as T (the time period) 
approaches infinity (the time dimension of the panel is large). Accordingly, as our time 
dimension is T = 38 and our cross-section dimension is N = 19, we choose to work with the 
fixed effects.  
This large time dimension of our panel raises the issue of a likely serial correlation of errors 
(serial correlation for each individual through the time period), contemporaneous correlation 
between individuals, and heteroscedasticity of disturbances in the model. We perform the 
tests of autocorrelation, homoscedasticity and independence of residuals between individuals 
where the null hypotheses are respectively the absence of autocorrelation AR (1) of 
disturbances, the homoscedasticity of disturbances and the absence of contemporaneously 
correlation of the residuals. The results of the tests5 reject all these null hypotheses. Thus, we 
need to use appropriate correction technique(s)6 to deal with those problems. For panels with 
 
5
 These results are available upon request. 
6
 Note that with the LSDV estimator, although the presence of the lagged dependent 
variables can deal with the serial correlation of errors, it doesn’t take into account the 
contemporaneous correlation of errors. 
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dimensions like ours (T>N), the econometric literature proposed either the Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) of Parks-Kmenta7 or the Panel Corrected Standard Errors 
(PCSEs) of Beck and Katz (1995). However, Beck and Katz (1995, 2001) have shown 
evidence that the PCSEs method is not only more accurate and performs well compare to the 
FGLS estimator (especially for T>15), pointing out that when FGLS are considered and 
tested, the standard errors are too optimistic. The Panel Corrected Standard Errors, by 
enabling us to deal with the problems of panel heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and 
contemporaneously correlation, allows for the unit specific AR1 term to correct for serial 
correlation: we use this method in this study. Beside these estimators, the econometric 
literature also proposes the Fixed Effects where standard errors are computed using Driscoll-
Kraay (1998) method (henceforth referred to as FE-DK). In fact, the Driscoll-Kraay standard 
errors estimates are heteroscedasticity consistent and robust to every general forms of spatial 
and temporal dependence in the residuals. In this paper, we test the robustness of our baseline 
model’s results by the use of the FE-DK8 (Fixed Effects with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors) 
technique. In addition, because the one or two years lagged dependent variable(s) can be 
included in the model, depending on the Maddala (1987)’s test, we would have also used the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator or the LSDVC (least square dummy 
variables corrected) as an alternative to LSDV technique for the robustness of our baseline 
model’s results. However, the GMM estimator relies on the strong hypothesis that the time 
period be lower than the cross-section dimension that is, N>T and the LSDVC9 estimator 
relies on the strong hypothesis that all regressors should be exogenous, not even weakly 
exogenous.  For all these reasons, we use as our main estimator the LSDV estimator with 
Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) technique and for another robustness check, the 
FE-DK standard errors technique. Note also that regarding the LSDV with the PCSEs,  if the 
Maddala’s (1987) test reveals the presence of a “state-dependence” in the dynamic 
specification, then we apply the OLS-fixed effects (LSDV) regression with one or two years 
lagged dependent variables (to correct for serial correlation) without the Panel-Specific 
 
7 This procedure was first described by Parks (1967) and popularized latter by Kmenta 
(1986). Thus, it is usually known either as Parks or as Parks-Kmenta. 
8
 The results are obtained by the use of the Stata module « xtscc » implemented by Hoechle 
(2007). 
9
 See Kiviet (1995, 1999) and Bun and Kiviet (2003). 
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AR(1) correction. If the dynamic specification is “error dynamics,” then we use the OLS-
fixed effects (LSDV) regression with the Prais-Winsten procedure based on the panel-
specific AR(1).  
Recognize that the previous assumption of our model parameters’ homogeneity is strong, we 
relax it by examining the variation across different groups of countries and test to what extent 
the average effect varies according to the group of countries observed. Therefore, we split our 
sample into two major groups (although recognizing that any splitting of our sample into sub-
samples remains somewhat arbitrary) and estimate the baseline model over the whole period 
1970–2007. This will allow us to check whether the magnitudes of the coefficients of interest 
obtained over these sub-groups are different from those obtained over the full sample. The 
groups are then:  
- The group of European Countries (EU): Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and United Kingdom.  
 - The group of Non-European Union countries (Non-EU): Australia, Canada, Japan, 
and United States.  
 The next section is devoted to the discussion of the expected sign of the different regressors 
included in the model. 
  
4.2 Discussion on the expected signs of the variables 
The number of fiscal consolidation episodes: We follow Dang et al., (2009) procedure to 
capture the effects of financial crisis on aid effort to introduce in our model a variable that 
captures the effects of fiscal consolidation: the “number of years of fiscal consolidation.” 
This variable records the number of years since the first year where a fiscal consolidation 
occurs, with the first year taking a value of “1” and the value “0” for all years subsequent to 
the fiscal consolidation end’s year. To allow the effect to diminish over time, we include this 
counter variable in both linear and square terms in the model. In other words, we expect a 
negative effect of the counter variable “number of years of fiscal consolidation” but a positive 
effect of its square terms.  
In fact, during the episodes of large fiscal consolidation, governments tighten their budgets 
and reduce the high debt levels to make public finances sustainable. Therefore, we can expect 
governments to reduce several items of expenditure including spending on aid flows, despite 
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their firm commitment to increase aid exports to recipient countries. However, as Round and 
Odedokun (2004: P306) have mentioned, since “aid can act as an immense foreign policy 
tool for donor governments, it is not a particular discretionary item in the budget”; thus, it 
may not be reduced even in deterioration of public finance situations. Although this argument 
runs contrary to the expectation of a procyclical pattern of foreign aid (Hallet, 2009), we can 
also expect aid expenditures to be protected during the episodes of fiscal consolidation. In 
other words, large fiscal consolidation can exert a positive effect on aid flows. In addition, we 
also assume the governments in the face of several competing government expenditures 
reduce several items but maintain or increase aid exports for strategic or geopolitical reasons: 
aid could be protected even when spending is being constrained (Round and Odedokun, 
2004). 
 
The number of fiscal stimuli episodes: The construction of this variable also refers to Dang 
et al., (2009) and thus, follows the same procedure as for the variable “number of years of 
fiscal consolidation” with the difference here being that this variable records the number of 
years since the first year of the occurrence of a fiscal stimulus. This variable takes the value 
of “1” for the first year, “2” for the second year, and the value “0” for all years subsequent to 
the fiscal stimuli end’s year. To allow the effect to diminish over time, we also include this 
counter variable in both linear and square terms in the model.  
During large episodes of fiscal stimuli that aim to stimulate the domestic activity, aid 
expenditures may decrease (this is considered a discretionary component that is cut in favor 
of social and investment spending), increase as the other discretionary components of 
expenditures, or it may neither increase nor decrease.   In other words, we expect a positive, 
neutral, or even a negative effect of this variable.  
 
The budget deficit and the public debt: As in Mosley (1985), Round and Odedokun (2004), 
Faini (2006), and Bertoli et al. (2008), we hypothesize that the cases of weaker fiscal position 
characterized by larger budget deficits and high levels of public debt will ceteris paribus lead 
to the reduction in the level of discretionary spending, especially that of aid flows – because 
of strong pressures to reduce deficits and public debt and preserve scarce foreign currency. In 
other words, a healthy fiscal position will be associated ceteris paribus with higher spending, 
including on official development assistance. We also follow Bertoli et al. (2008) and 
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hypothesize that “given the small volume of aid relative to GDP, it is the overall level of 
public expenditures rather than its allocation among different expenditures chapters that 
influences the volume of aid” (see also Faini, 2006).  
In contrast to these hypotheses and in accord with Bertoli et al. (2008), we can also assume 
that weak budgetary positions – or significant debt overhang may not have a detrimental 
impact on foreign aid, provided that the governments adopt an accommodating attitude 
toward the fiscal disequilibria over the medium term. 
 
Output gap: The effect of the output gap (the difference between the maximum output 
achievable and the actual level of output) can be either positive or negative: we can expect 
positive output shocks to lead to higher aid expenditure by traditional OECD donors and 
negative shocks to exert an adverse effect on their aid supplies. However, if aid expenditure 
is considered to be a specific protected item of the budget (for several reasons, including 
political or geostrategic ones), aid exports could rise if OECD DAC members experience 
negative shocks and at least not decline (at best increase) in the aftermath of a positive shock 
in these countries.  
 
5. EVALUATION OF THE ESTIMATION RESULTS 
In this section, we turn to the interpretation of the results stemming from performing our 
regressions. Before interpreting these results, let us say a few words about the results of 
Maddala’s (1987) test (see Table 1).  "Insert Table 1 around here". 
For each kind of aid variable, the test is performed on both the one-year lagged values 
and the two-year lagged values, because additional lagged values appear not to be significant. 
The Maddala’s (1987) test suggests that if the test for the restriction of coefficients is 
rejected, then we test for the significance of the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable. 
If the latter is significantly different from zero, we can conclude that the model is “state 
dependent”. Conversely, if the test for the restriction of coefficients is not rejected, then we 
test for serial correlation by testing whether the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable 
is equal to zero. If the latter does not hold, we conclude that the model can be considered as a 
“serial correlation model”: the presence of the lagged dependent variable(s) in the model 
corrects only for serial correlation and does not drive any state dependence over time.  
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Based on the results of the Maddala’s (1987) test displayed in Table 1, on the procedure of 
estimation described in sub-section 4.1 and in the possible interpretations described above, 
we perform the different regressions, the results of which are reported in Tables 2 to Table 5. 
In all of these tables, the dependent variables (as mentioned above) are: the total net aid 
(bilateral and multilateral) disbursements as a percentage of GDP when debt forgiveness is 
subtracted out, and this variable broken down by channel (multilateral versus bilateral) and 
by recipient development income classification (the OECD classification)): bilateral aid, 
multilateral aid10, aid to LDCs, aid to other LICs, aid to LMICs, aid to UMICs and Aid to 
Africa. 
"Insert Table 2 around here".  
The Table 2 related to our full sample of the 19 OECD DAC Countries, reports the results 
associated to the effects of fiscal episodes on each of these different dependent variables by 
the use of the LSDV technique with the Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs) and/or the 
Prais-Winsten estimators.  
The results suggest evidence that whereas fiscal retrenchment episodes do not affect the total 
ODA (minus debt forgiveness), fiscal stimuli episodes do affect it: the higher the number of 
large fiscal expansion years, the higher the overall aid expenditures (minus debt relief) 
distributed by OECD DAC countries, with this increase diminishing over time (after 1.06 
years). The same interpretation applies to Bilateral ODA. Multilateral ODA appears to not 
being affected by fiscal stimuli periods in OECD DAC countries but seems to decrease 
(though the coefficient is statistically significant only at 10%) during fiscal consolidation 
episodes. However, the aid effort of OECD DAC countries towards Least Developed 
Countries is dictated by fiscal circumstances in these donors’ countries: aid provision 
declines during large fiscal consolidation periods (there is no rebound over time) and 
increases during fiscal stimuli episodes (this rise diminishes after 1.03 years). Fiscal episodes 
do not matter for OECD DAC countries’ aid exports to group of income countries “Other 
Low-Income Countries”, Lower-Middle-Income Countries and the Upper Middle Income 
Countries appear to be affected by large changes in fiscal policy in OECD DAC countries: 
surprisingly, OECD DAC countries’ aid exports to LMICs decline permanently following 
 
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 The Multilateral Aid is naturally not net of debt forgiveness.  
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fiscal retrenchment measures and increase (with a likely declining approximately after 1.12 
years) when donors’ countries implement large fiscal stimuli policies; in contrast, large 
discretionary fiscal stimuli measures do not influence aid to Upper Middle Income Countries, 
but the latter plummets during large fiscal consolidation episodes (there is here a chance of 
rebounding of this aid over time, even if the coefficient is statistically significant at only 10% 
level). Turning now to the peculiar Africa’s region (a region that particularly needs high 
levels of aid inflows for its development), the results suggest evidence that large changes in 
fiscal policies in OECD DAC countries influence aid exports to this region. Indeed, on one 
side, the higher the number of years of fiscal tightening measures in donors’ countries, the 
lower their aid expenditures to Africa. However, there is a likely rebound after approximately 
1.5 years. On the other side, OECD Donors’ aid exports to Africa appear to benefit from the 
large fiscal stimuli measures adopted in OECD DAC countries but this positive effect is 
short-lasting as the donors’ aid effort starts declining after approximately 14 months.  
Regarding the control variables, the results show evidence that the fiscal balance appears to 
be significant and negative in only one regression (that of LMICs); the public debt seems to 
exhibit alternating negative and non significant coefficients, suggesting that the accumulation 
of public debt can have a negative impact on aid effort. The output gap also appears to be 
significant only in one regression (regression with Total Aid).  
"Insert Table 3 around here". 
The use of the Fixed Effects associated with the Driscoll-Kraay standard errors technique for 
robustness check (see Table 3) leads us to conclude that the results obtained are similar 
(although with slightly different standard errors) to those in Table 2 apart from the fact that 
Multilateral aid supplied by OECD DAC countries declines here severely when they 
experience large fiscal tightening measures. Nevertheless, in contrast with the result in Table 
2, resumption appears after 1.3 years. Note also that as mentioned above, the results of our 
coefficients of interest remain roughly stable and robust to the inclusion of the additional 
control variables quoted above (see sub-section 4.1) only once in the baseline regression. The 
results tables could be obtained upon request.  
"Insert Table 4 around here". 
"Insert Table 5 around here". 
In the Tables 4 and 5, we report the results concerning the sub-samples of European Union 
and Non-European Union countries. We observe that European Union countries appear to 
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exhibit roughly the same behaviour as those observed over the full sample (in Table 2). 
However, Non-European Union countries belonging to our sample do not behave similarly to 
Europeans in terms of aid expenditures during large changes in their fiscal policies. Indeed, 
irrespective of the “aid variable” considered, large discretionary fiscal tightening and stimuli 
policies do not matter for aid supplied by Non-European Union countries, apart from two 
special cases: surprisingly, Multilateral ODA supplied by these countries decline during fiscal 
expansion episodes (the coefficient is significant at only 10% level), with this decline not 
diminishing over time; aid expenditures of Non-European donors’ countries towards Africa’s 
region seem to increase when these countries implement large discretionary fiscal expansion 
measures, but this positive effect start declining just after approximately 9 months.  
The aid effort of Non-European Union countries seem to be determined by the overall fiscal 
stance of the countries in a given year (as shown by certain significant and negative 
coefficients of the variable capturing the fiscal balance and certain significant and negative 
coefficients of the variable capturing the stock of public debt). Overall, it appears from our 
analysis that whereas the distribution of aid expenditures among developing countries by 
European Union DAC Countries is to some extent dictated by fiscal circumstances, especially 
by large changes in fiscal policies in these countries the Non-European Union DAC countries 
behave totally in a different way since their aid effort is not mainly determined by their fiscal 
circumstances.      
     
6. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we analyze the behavior of OECD donor countries with respect to the 
distribution of their aid expenditures during the fiscal episodes (episodes of fiscal 
consolidation and episodes of fiscal stimuli). The focus here is on a sample of 19 OECD 
DAC countries as well as on two sub-samples (European Union and Non-European Union 
countries) over the period 1970-2007. We use descriptive statistics provided by Alesina and 
Ardagna (2010) on large fiscal episodes in OECD countries and regression models to perform 
this analysis. The empirical results suggest evidence that aid supplied by traditional OECD 
DAC countries respond to large changes in fiscal policies in these countries: on one side, 
whereas the total aid (net of debt forgiveness), the bilateral aid and  “OtherLICs” do not seem 
to be affected by episodes of large fiscal consolidation, the latter appearing to influence 
Multilateral aid, aid to LDCs, aid to LMICs, aid to UMICs and particularly aid to Africa’ 
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region with a chance of some of these negative effects to be resorbed over time; on the other 
side, large fiscal expansion measures in OECD donor countries exert a positive impact on the 
total aid flows, as well as the bilateral aid, aid to Least Developed Countries, aid to LMICs 
particularly aid to Africa, with all these positive effects declining over time.  
The results also show evidence that the behaviour of the sub-sample of European Union 
countries is similar to that of the full sample of OECD DAC countries. However, the Non-
European countries of our sample display an opposite behaviour with regard to their aid 
expenditures during large fiscal tightening and large fiscal expansion policies: except few 
cases (multilateral aid and aid to Africa), neither large fiscal consolidation measures nor large 
fiscal stimuli policies exert an impact of the aid effort of the sub-group of Non-European 
countries. The aid supplied by this sub-group of countries seems to be driven by other factors 
than fiscal ones, such as political factors or trade interests. Since the purpose of this study is 
not to examine the determinants11 of aid effort, but rather to focus on how large changes in 
fiscal policies of the traditional OECD DAC countries affect their aid supply, it would be 
interesting to explore in another study what kind of political and economic variables shape 
the aid effort of the sub-group of Non-European countries.  
Furthermore, we would like to highlight two limits to our study: the first is our focus on only 
traditional OECD donors which are the main ones in terms of aid supply. However, the so-
called “emerging countries” have appeared recently to start playing an important role in terms 
of aid provision to the other developing countries within the framework of South-South 
cooperation. It would thus be interesting to explore in another study whether fiscal policy 
measures in these “emerging countries” matter for their development assistance.  
One may also require us to extend our database to the recent year for which fiscal variables 
are available (2011) (though the fiscal episodes variables come from Alesina and Ardagna, 
2010). This is not really a limit of our study because the fiscal austerity measures currently 
adopted by many OECD countries especially European Union countries are on-going and will 
last many years (for example, these measures should be implemented until 2017 for France). 
Therefore, such extension seems unsuitable.  
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our baseline model to test the robustness of its results (see above). As mentioned above, our 
baseline model coefficients do not change and the results are available upon request. 
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The empirical shortfall of aid exports to Africa observed over the full sample of OECD 
countries is in accordance with the 2010’s announcement of OECD to reduce aid supplies to 
Africa, as well as the different figures of aid disbursements in 2011 compared to 2010. Given 
the severity of the multiple crises faced by OECD countries, one could suspect that their aid 
effort will not resume before several years. This severe aid decline will be dramatic for 
poverty in developing countries and jeopardize their efforts to attain the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), as in these hard economic times, these countries are also 
affected by lower investments and lower exports.  
Overall, our findings raise an important question: given the high dependence of aid flows on 
fiscal circumstances in donor countries and also given the heavy reliance of many developing 
countries (particularly Low-Income Countries) on these aid inflows, shouldn’t it be better for 
the international community to help the aid recipients improve substantially their capacity to 
mobilize domestic revenue ? In fact, for any country in the world, the tax revenues are 
unavoidably the main source of fiscal revenue in the long term. The call by the international 
community at the Monterrey Consensus (2002) to mobilize additional financial financing 
mechanisms for developing countries can contribute to this ultimate goal. 
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APPENDICES AND TABLES 
Table 1 : Maddala (1987)’s test for “Net Aid Disbursements, net of debt forgiveness”on the baseline equation, 1970-2007  
  Full OECD 
Sample
EU Sub-Sample Non-EU Sub-Sample
   
Test for 1tTotal −  On the restriction of Coefficients 6.03 (0.0000) 5.20 (0.0551) 0.92 (0.4970) 
On the coefficient of 1tTotal −  161.90 (0.0000) 117.89 (0.0000) 31.64 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tTotal −  On the restriction of Coefficients 2.18 (0.0347) 1.97 (0.0577) 0.18 (0.9881) 
On the coefficient of 2tTotal −  57.46 (0.0000) 45.32 (0.0000) 13.16 (0.0004) 
Test for 1tBilateral −  On the restriction of Coefficients 3.88 (0.0004) 3.40 (0.0015) 0.23 (0.9770) 
On the coefficient of 1tBilateral −  175.30 (0.0000) 125.64 (0.0000) 43.98 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tBilateral −  On the restriction of Coefficients 1.10 (0.3607) 1.00 (0.4312) 0.07 (0.9994) 
On the coefficient of 2tBilateral −  39.62 (0.0000) 33.44 (0.0000) 2.30 (0.1317) 
Test for 1tMultilateral −  On the restriction of Coefficients 2.32 (0.0242) 1.95 (0.0604) 1.25 (0.2785) 
On the coefficient of 1tMultilateral −  99.43 (0.0000) 84.61 (0.0000) 10.74 (0.0014) 
Test for 2tMultilateral −  On the restriction of Coefficients 1.13 (0.3436) 1.03 (0.4068) 0.25 (0.9702) 
On the coefficient of 2tMultilateral −  33.45 (0.0000) 18.63 (0.0000) 13.99 (0.0003) 
Test for 1tLDCs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 9.01 (0.0000) 8.98 (0.0000) 0.65 (0.7151) 
On the coefficient of 1tLDCs −  195.38 (0.0000) 136.56 (0.0000) 51.44 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tLDCs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 0.95 (0.4643) 1.12 (0.3507) 0.92 (0.4928) 
On the coefficient of 2tLDCs −  38.31 (0.0000) 34.92 (0.0000) 0.05 (0.8160) 
Test for 1tOtherLICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients    2.26 (0.0286) 3.08 (0.0035) 0.31 (0.9483) 
On the coefficient of 1tOtherLICs −  189.49 (0.0000) 178.51 (0.0000) 26.59 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tOtherLICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 1.29 (0.2516) 1.53 (0.1546) 0.19 (0.9867) 
On the coefficient of 2tOtherLICs −  62.33 (0.0000) 10.71 (0.0012) 43.22 (0.0000) 
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Test for 1tLMICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 2.24 (0.0296) 1.32 (0.2375) 0.96 (0.4613) 
On the coefficient of 1tLMICs −  210.04 (0.0000) 153.94 (0.0000) 48.40 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tLMICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 1.13 ( 0.3396) 0.69 (0.6777) 0.78 (0.6018) 
On the coefficient of 2tLMICs −  6.44 (0.0115) 4.25 (0.0400) 1.82 (0.1796) 
Test for 1tUMICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 2.17 (0.0351) 2.28 (0.0277) 0.27 (0.9654) 
On the coefficient of 1tUMICs −  156.15 (0.0000) 114.23 (0.0000) 33.62 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tUMICs −  On the restriction of Coefficients 1.05 (0.3920) 1.29 (0.2549) 1.00 (0.4356) 
On the coefficient of 2tUMICs −  9.46 (0.0022) 8.11 (0.0046) 0.12 (0.7343) 
Test for 1tAfrica −  On the restriction of Coefficients   5.95 (0.0000) 6.07 (0.0000) 0.62 (0.7379) 
On the coefficient of 1tAfrica −  242.48 (0.0000) 183.11 (0.0000) 26.65 (0.0000) 
Test for 2tAfrica −  On the restriction of Coefficients 0.68 (0.6907) 0.96 (0.4585) 0.50 (0.8299) 
On the coefficient of 2tAfrica −  19.27 (0.0000) 14.30 (0.0002) 2.89 (0.0915) 
Note: The table contains F-Statistics and the P-Value associated.  
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Table 2: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in DAC OECD Countries on net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (% of GDP), 1970-2007   
Estimator: LSDV technique with Panel Corrected Standard Errors.   
 
 1a 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b 8b
 
Total Bilateral Multilateral LDCs OtherLICs LMICs UMICs Africa 
Variables         
Aidt-1 0.517*** 0.768*** 0.552*** 0.811*** 0.841*** 0.710*** 0.628*** 0.804*** 
 (0.0513) (0.0302) (0.0398) (0.0233) (0.0169) (0.0327) (0.0294) (0.0243) 
Aidt-2 0.300***        
 (0.0499)        
Numbertight -0.0116 -0.00450 -0.00918* -0.00718** -0.00208 -0.00380 -0.00257* -0.0118*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00939) (0.00515) (0.00326) (0.00157) (0.00321) (0.00136) (0.00372) 
Numbertightsq -0.000644 -0.00296 0.00352 0.00164 0.000334 0.00233* 0.000996* 0.00397** 
 (0.00466) (0.00392) (0.00230) (0.00140) (0.000741) (0.00130) (0.000550) (0.00158) 
Numberstimuli 0.0296** 0.0279*** 0.000384 0.0107** 0.00189 0.0101*** 0.000515 0.0188*** 
 (0.0128) (0.0103) (0.00637) (0.00424) (0.00172) (0.00384) (0.00170) (0.00439) 
Numberstimulisq -0.0140** -0.0132*** -0.00125 -0.00517*** -0.000816 -0.00452*** -0.000571 -0.00816*** 
 
(0.00605) (0.00459) (0.00299) (0.00198) (0.000833) (0.00167) (0.000770) (0.00200) 
Govnetlend 0.000192 -0.000478 -0.000269 -1.50e-05 0.000120 -0.000482* -0.000201 0.000119 
 (0.000814) (0.000661) (0.000421) (0.000260) (0.000113) (0.000276) (0.000128) (0.000300) 
Pubdebt -0.000229** -0.000218** 1.88e-06 -9.97e-05*** 2.25e-05 -6.55e-05 1.28e-05 -0.000106*** 
 (9.87e-05) (8.75e-05) (4.34e-05) (3.59e-05) (1.82e-05) (4.34e-05) (1.44e-05) (3.72e-05) 
Outputgap 0.00302* 0.00215 0.000108 0.000428 0.000269 0.000569 -9.59e-06 0.000703 
 (0.00158) (0.00152) (0.000712) (0.000431) (0.000186) (0.000405) (0.000182) (0.000437) 
Constant 0.0254 0.0754*** 0.0461*** 0.0126*** 0.00978*** 0.0215*** 0.00606*** 0.00559 
 (0.0156) (0.0137) (0.00578) (0.00327) (0.00337) (0.00396) (0.00143) (0.00361) 
         
Countries-Obs 19-601 19-613 19-601 19-597 19-590 19-597 19-594 19-597 
Overall R2 0.958 0.932 0.908 0.948 0.934 0.815 0.709 0.941 
Country and/or Year 
Dummies Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01. –  
Notes related to the Results of Maddala’s (1987) test: 
The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable”. a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable.- b: The model is “state-dependent” only 
with one year lagged values of the dependent variable.- c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable.- d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is 
the presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 3: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in DAC OECD Countries on net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (% of GDP), 1970-2007   
Estimator: Fixed Effects with Driscoll-Kraay Standard Errors  
 
 1a 2b 3b 4b 5b 6b 7b 8b
 
Total Bilateral Multilateral LDCs OtherLICs LMICs UMICs Africa 
Variables        
 
Aidt-1 0.517*** 0.768*** 0.552*** 0.811*** 0.841*** 0.710*** 0.628*** 0.804*** 
 (0.0715) (0.0422) (0.0621) (0.0396) (0.0353) (0.0302) (0.0753) (0.0376) 
Aidt-2 0.300***        
 (0.0737)        
Numbertight -0.0116 -0.00450 -0.00918** -0.00718* -0.00208 -0.00380 -0.00257* -0.0118** 
 (0.00798) (0.00615) (0.00399) (0.00414) (0.00151) (0.00314) (0.00132) (0.00455) 
Numbertightsq 
-0.000644 -0.00296 0.00352** 0.00164 0.000334 0.00233* 0.000996** 0.00397** 
 (0.00434) (0.00299) (0.00133) (0.00165) (0.000670) (0.00132) (0.000448) (0.00178) 
Numberstimuli 0.0296* 0.0279* 0.000384 0.0107* 0.00189 0.0101*** 0.000515 0.0188** 
 (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.00586) (0.00536) (0.00340) (0.00334) (0.000933) (0.00769) 
Numberstimulisq 
-0.0140** -0.0132** -0.00125 -0.00517** -0.000816 -0.00452*** -0.000571 -0.00816** 
 
(0.00595) (0.00641) (0.00186) (0.00228) (0.00142) (0.00133) (0.000452) (0.00332) 
Govnetlend 0.000192 -0.000478 -0.000269 -1.50e-05 0.000120 -0.000482 -0.000201 0.000119 
 (0.000789) (0.000740) (0.000552) (0.000203) (0.000176) (0.000451) (0.000198) (0.000291) 
Pubdebt -0.000229* -0.000218** 1.88e-06 -9.97e-05** 2.25e-05 -6.55e-05 1.28e-05 -0.000106** 
 (0.000129) (0.000100) (8.81e-05) (4.20e-05) (1.91e-05) (4.63e-05) (1.92e-05) (4.34e-05) 
Outputgap 0.00302** 0.00215** 0.000108 0.000428 0.000269 0.000569 -9.59e-06 0.000703 
 (0.00129) (0.00104) (0.000844) (0.000528) (0.000174) (0.000638) (0.000288) (0.000676) 
Constant 0.0545*** 0.0511*** 0.0764*** 0.0167*** 0.0120*** 0.0214*** 0.00729*** 0.0242*** 
 (0.0112) (0.0110) (0.00930) (0.00469) (0.00209) (0.00311) (0.00183) (0.00590) 
 
        
Countries-Obs 19-601 19-613 19-601 19-597 19-590 19-597 19-594 19-597 
Within R2 0.6963 0.6679 0.4212 0.7679 0.8344 0.5787 0.4475 0.7581 
Country and/or Year 
Dummies Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
Notes related to the Results of Maddala’s (1987) test: 
The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable”. a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model is “state-dependent” only with 
one year lagged values of the dependent variable. c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the 
presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 4: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in European Union Countries on net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (% of GDP), 1970-2007   
Estimator: LSDV technique with Panel Corrected Standard Errors   
 
 1a 2b 3b 4b 5b 6d 7b 8b
 Total Bilateral Multilateral LDCs OtherLICs LMICs UMICs Africa 
Variables        
Aidt-1 0.513*** 0.750*** 0.591*** 0.809*** 0.754***  0.655*** 0.799*** 
 (0.0573) (0.0341) (0.0450) (0.0246) (0.0359)  (0.0292) (0.0251) 
Aidt-2 0.297***        
 (0.0563)        
Numbertight -0.0107 -0.00488 -0.00749 -0.00832** -0.00155 -0.000401 -0.00343** -0.0141*** 
 (0.0119) (0.0108) (0.00556) (0.00382) (0.00174) (0.00308) (0.00146) (0.00436) 
Numbertightsq -0.00244 -0.00369 0.00220 0.00168 8.41e-05 0.000734 0.00130** 0.00457** 
 (0.00519) (0.00443) (0.00244) (0.00163) (0.000828) (0.00128) (0.000592) (0.00185) 
Numberstimuli 0.0392*** 0.0311** 0.00745 0.00978* 0.00209 0.00469 0.000414 0.0174*** 
 (0.0150) (0.0122) (0.00712) (0.00502) (0.00192) (0.00381) (0.00193) (0.00519) 
Numberstimulisq -0.0171** -0.0139*** -0.00392 -0.00450** -0.000779 -0.00274* -0.000388 -0.00750*** 
 
(0.00677) (0.00524) (0.00326) (0.00227) (0.000897) (0.00161) (0.000835) (0.00229) 
Govnetlend 0.00109 -2.35e-05 -5.49e-05 0.000107 0.000280** -0.00144** -0.000319** 0.000248 
 (0.000925) (0.000786) (0.000484) (0.000306) (0.000125) (0.000638) (0.000138) (0.000343) 
Pubdebt -0.000299* -0.000302** 1.27e-05 -0.000171*** -1.71e-05 0.000117 6.20e-05*** -0.000216*** 
 (0.000154) (0.000135) (6.71e-05) (5.56e-05) (2.23e-05) (7.30e-05) (1.93e-05) (6.28e-05) 
Outputgap 0.00418** 0.00281 0.000820 0.000461 0.000371* 0.000204 -4.75e-05 0.000872* 
 (0.00195) (0.00189) (0.000818) (0.000534) (0.000221) (0.000702) (0.000216) (0.000525) 
Constant 0.0966*** 0.141*** 0.101*** 0.0402*** 0.0123*** -0.000977 0.0129*** 0.0583*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0259) (0.0184) (0.00989) (0.00346) (0.0167) (0.00304) (0.0101) 
 
        
Countries-Obs 457-15 465-15 453-15 449-15 442-15 451-15 446-15 449-15 
Overall R2 0.960 0.934 0.917 0.944 0.884 0.447 0.738 0.937 
Country and/or Country 
Dummies Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
Notes related to the Results of Maddala’s (1987) test: 
The regressor “Aid” denotes the “Aid variable”. a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model is “state-dependent” only with 
one year lagged values of the dependent variable. c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the 
presence of one or two year lagged values of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Table 5: Effects of Fiscal Episodes in Non-European Union Countries on net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness (% of GDP), 1970-2007   
Estimator: LSDV technique with Panel Corrected Standard Errors   
 
 1d 2d 3d 4d 5d 6d 7d 8d
 Total Bilateral Multilateral LDCs OtherLICs LMICs UMICs Africa 
Variables         
 
        
Numbertight 0.00479 0.00317 0.0101 -0.00469 -0.00200 0.00100 0.00228 0.000214 
 (0.0190) (0.0137) (0.0140) (0.00504) (0.00749) (0.00825) (0.00297) (0.00885) 
Numbertightsq 0.00532 0.00221 0.00116 0.00248 0.000534 0.000712 -0.000548 -0.000861 
 (0.00835) (0.00614) (0.00635) (0.00236) (0.00320) (0.00354) (0.00127) (0.00442) 
Numberstimuli -0.0383 -0.00337 -0.0382* -0.00158 0.00572 -0.00164 0.00164 0.0256*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0191) (0.0213) (0.00640) (0.0122) (0.00952) (0.00359) (0.00950) 
Numberstimulisq 0.0139 -0.00682 0.0250 -0.000261 -0.00449 -0.00183 -0.00157 -0.0172*** 
 
(0.0209) (0.0145) (0.0169) (0.00456) (0.0105) (0.00600) (0.00239) (0.00524) 
Govnetlend -0.00957*** -0.00778*** 0.000215 -0.00167** -0.000829 -0.00240* 0.000194 -0.000297 
 (0.00248) (0.00192) (0.00111) (0.000696) (0.00131) (0.00136) (0.000360) (0.00101) 
Pubdebt 0.000361 0.000241 0.000240** -0.000233*** 0.000554** -0.000332** 3.13e-05 -0.000117 
 (0.000312) (0.000313) (0.000103) (7.21e-05) (0.000229) (0.000145) (3.68e-05) (8.09e-05) 
Outputgap 0.00445 0.00423** -0.000656 0.000495 -6.27e-05 0.00201 -8.98e-05 0.000296 
 (0.00283) (0.00214) (0.00173) (0.000772) (0.00141) (0.00135) (0.000456) (0.00110) 
Constant 0.363*** 0.255*** 0.112*** 0.0582*** 0.0822*** 0.0614*** 0.0180*** 0.0179*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0147) (0.00790) (0.00409) (0.0201) (0.00729) (0.00234) (0.00397) 
         
Countries-Obs 148-4 148-4 148-4 148-4 148-4 148-4 148-4 148-4 
Overall R2 0.952 0.939 0.607 0.605 0.594 0.592 0.494 0.697 
Country and or Year 
Dummies Significance 
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Note: *p-value<0,1; **p-value<0,05; ***p-value<0,01.  
Notes related to the Results of Maddala’s (1987) test: 
a: The model is “state-dependent” with one and two year lagged values of the dependent variable. b: The model is “state-dependent” only with one year lagged values of the dependent 
variable. c: The model is “state-dependent” only with two year lagged values of the dependent variable. d: The model is “error dynamic” (that is the presence of one or two year lagged values 
of the dependent variable corrects only for serial correlation). 
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Appendix 1: Description of variables and Sources 
 
Total = Net Official Development Assistance disbursed by each donor minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP. This variable includes bilateral ODA as well as ODA to 
multilateral institutions. Source: Development Assistance Committee of OECD. 
 
Numbertight = the Number of years since the fiscal consolidation has started in a donor 
country. Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment identified 
by Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
Numbertightsq = the square of the number of years since the fiscal consolidation has started 
in a donor country. Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Adjustment 
identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
Numberstimuli = the Number of years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a donor country. 
Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli identified by Alesina 
and Ardagna (2010). 
Numberstimulisq = the square of the number of years since the fiscal stimuli has started in a 
donor country. Source: Calculated by the author using the Episodes of Fiscal Stimuli 
identified by Alesina and Ardagna (2010). 
Pubdebt = Gross Public Debt-to-GDP-ratio. Source: The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s New comprehensive database on Public debt – (November 2010). 
Govnetlend = General government fiscal balances (Total Revenues minus Total 
Expenditures) in percent of GDP. Source: OECD Economic Outlook N° 88 – December 
2010. 
 
Appendix 2:  The categories of development aid variables considered 
Total net aid disbursement minus debt forgiveness, as a percentage of GDP (denoted “Total” 
in the tables). 
Total Bilateral net aid disbursements minus debt forgiveness, in percent of GDP (denoted 
“Bilateral” in the tables). 
Total Multilateral net aid disbursements in percent of GDP (denoted “Multilateral” in the 
tables). 
Net aid disbursements to UMICs (Upper-Middle-Income Recipient Countries) minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP (denoted “UMICs” in the tables). 
Net aid disbursements to LDCs (Least Developed Recipients) minus debt forgiveness, in 
percent of GDP (denoted “LDCs” in the tables). 
Net aid disbursements to Other LICs (Other Low-Income Recipient Countries) minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP (denoted “OtherLICs” in the tables). 
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Net aid disbursements to LMICs (Lower-Middle-Income Recipient Countries) minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP (denoted “LMICs” in the tables). 
Net aid disbursements to Africa (Upper-Middle-Income Recipient Countries) minus debt 
forgiveness, in percent of GDP (denoted “Africa” in the tables).  
 
Appendix 3: The Episodes of fiscal adjustment and Stimuli identified by Ardagna and Alesina 
(2010) 
Country Episodes of fiscal adjustments Episodes of fiscal Stimuli 
Australia 1987 1988 1990 1991 
Austria 1984 1996 1997 2005 1975 2004 
Belgium 1982 1984 1987 2006 1975 1981 2005 
Canada 1981 1986 1987 1995 1996 1997 1975 1982 1991 2001 
Denmark 1983 1984 1985 1986 2005 1974 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Finland 1973 1976 1981 1984 1988 1994 1996 1978 1982 1983 1987 1990 1991 
France 1979 1996 1975 1981 1992 1993 2002 
Germany  1996 2000 1995 2001 
Greece 1976 1986 1991 1994 1996 2005 2006 1981 1985 1989 1995 2001 
Ireland 1976 1984 1987 1988 1989 2000 1974 1975 1978 2001 2007 
Italy  1976 1980 1982 1990 1991 1992 1997 1972 1975 1981 2001 
Japan 1984 1999 2001 2006 1975 1993 1998 2005 2007 
Netherlands 1972 1973 1983 1988 1991 1993 1996 1975 1980 1995 2001 2002 
New Zealand 1987 1989 1993 1994 2000 1988 
Norway 1979 1980 1983 1989 1996 2000 2004 1974 1976 1977 1986 1987 1991 
Portugal 1982 1983 1986 1988 1992 1995 2002 1978 1985 1993 2005 
Spain 1986 1987 1994 1996 1981 1982 1993 
Sweden 1981 1983 1984 1986 1987 1994 1996 1974 1977 1979 1980 1991 1992 
United Kingdom 1977 1982 1988 1996 1997 1998 2000 1971 1972 1973 1990 1991 1992 
United States  2002 
 
Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics for the full sample of 19 countries 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Minimum Maximum 
Total 698 0.3834206 0.237751 0.0123208 1.040209 
Bilateral 698 0.2664351 0.1681259 0.0001609 0.7653306 
Multilateral 686 0.1368092 0.0892978 0.0149068 0.4230811 
Africa 679 0.1080993 0.0913522 -0.0490529 0.4348712 
North Africa 642 0.0114865 0.0192585 -0.0864862 0.1710931 
South Africa 679 0.0942579 0.0839063 0.0006688 0.4344764 
LDCs 679 0.0866175 0.0734737 0.0007832 0.4292414 
Other LICs 673 0.0316807 0.0408299 -0.0007994 0.3507794 
LMICs 679 0.0711394 0.0465048 -0.0264144 0.3198324 
UMICs 675 0.0183391 0.0176495 -0.0214394 0.1241507 
Numbertight 653 0.194487 0.519999 0 4 
Numbertightsq 653 0.3078101 1.195037 0 16 
Numberstimuli 653 0.1653905 0.4734319 0 3 
Numberstimulisq 653 0.2511485 0.9615392 0 9 
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Govnetlend 690 -2.192955 4.329945 -16.00805 18.48245 
Pubdebtimf 712 52.32846 29.10584 0 191.6414 
Outputgap 644 -0.1337252 2.141367 -8.722275 6.514374 
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Appendix 5: Classification of Countries According to Income (OECD’s Classification) 
Africa : Angola, Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
African Rep, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep, Congo, Rep, Cote d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, 
Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda,  Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, St Helena, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania,  Togo, Tunisia Uganda, 
Zimbabwe.  
LDCs: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central Africa, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., 
Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda,  Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia,  Haiti, Cambodia, Laos, 
Timor-Leste, Afghanistan,  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Myanmar, Nepal, Yemen, Kiribati, 
Samoa,  Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. 
Other LICs: Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Korea, Dem. Rep, Vietnam, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Papua New Guinea. 
LMICs: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, FYR, Moldova, States Ex-Yugoslavia, 
Ukraine, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Congo, Rep., Namibia, 
Swaziland,  Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Guyana,  Paraguay, Peru, China, Indonesia, Mongolia, Philippines, Thailand, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, India,  Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Palestinian Adm. Areas, 
Syria, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Fed. States,  Niue, Tokelau, Tonga, Wallis and Futuna. 
UMICs: Belarus, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, Libya, Botswana, Gabon, Mauritius, Mayotte, 
Seychelles, South Africa, St. Helena, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Dominica,  Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Montserrat, Panama, St.Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, 
St.Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Suriname, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Malaysia, Kazakhstan,  Lebanon, Oman, Cook Islands, Fiji, Nauru, Palau. 
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